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ABSTRACT 
 
A STUDY ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRESIDENTIAL TERM LIMITS 
AND THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATION OF POWERS IN UGANDA 
 
By 
 
MUHWEZI, Stilson  
 
Presidential term limits are a measure through which citizens prevent the retention of a 
popular president or a leader from becoming a perpetual dictator. The clamour for democracy 
in recent years has tremendously changed the way many people aspire to be governed. 
Universal democratic values, including presidential term limits, are widely accepted. 
However, many presidents around the world have prolonged their stay in power after the 
expiry of their constitutionally allowed terms by amending the constitution, sometimes by 
using a rubber-stamp legislature or a referendum. Consequently, the initial purpose of having 
term limits in the first place—to prevent a dictatorship—has been defeated. The practice of 
amending or disregarding the constitution for the sake of a particular incumbent does harm to 
the development of democratic institutions and governance based on the rule of law. This 
paper reviews the normative debate over presidential term limits and identifies the key claims 
of proponents and opponents. It focuses on Uganda, Venezuela, Cameroon and Egypt as key 
examples where absence of term limits has in one way or the other skewed the balance of 
power in favour of the executive, leading to a dictatorship. The study then considers 
alternatives measures that a country like Uganda can take to minimize the tendency of 
executive dictatorship in the absence of term limits. However, this study concludes that there 
is no perfect substitute for term limits especially in a young democracy where fragile 
institutions need to be nurtured. As a way forward, the study recommends that the people of 
Uganda, together with their representatives, should seriously consider a future where term 
limits are restored and strict constitutional guarantees put in place to avoid the past mistakes.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background of the study 
As in the case of liberal democracy, the idea of presidential term limits is foreign to 
most African countries. Prior to her contact with the West, most powerful African states were 
kingdoms and chiefdoms headed by hereditary leaders. By the time most African states 
gained independence in the 1950s and 1960s, most kingdoms had been subdued or 
significantly weakened in favour of western style of states. Political power was handed over 
to newly-formed political parties whose leaders had little or no experience in running the new 
type of governments. In Uganda, for example, having a Constitution was a prerequisite for 
gaining independence from the former colonial master, the Great Britain. Besides having 
inadequate local constitutional experts, most of the discussions were held in London in a 
process that was hurriedly completed before granting independence on October 9, 1962.  
 
At independence, Uganda adopted a parliamentary system in which a ceremonial 
president and an executive Prime Minister became the top actors at the helm of Uganda’s 
politics. This system, however, was short-lived as the internal power struggles resulted in the 
1966 Constitutional crisis in which Dr. Apollo Milton Obote, the then Prime Minister, 
overthrew the Constitution, abolished kingdoms, and declared Uganda a republic. This was 
the first time in Uganda’s post-independence history that politics was militarized. It set a 
precedence for a series of bloody military coup d’états. Between 1966 and 1986, power 
changed hands seven times, none of which was through peaceful means. The last was in 1986 
which was a culmination of a five-year guerilla war that was wedged against the government 
by the National Resistance Army (NRA) which later became the National Resistance 
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Movement (NRM), promising a fundamental change. After 10 years of military dictatorship, 
a Constitution was written and adopted in 1995, to bring back a democracy and the rule of 
law.  
 
Term limits under the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 
The 1995 Constitution, among other things, sought to remedy the culture of violent 
transfer of power and replace it with power transfer through elections. By peaceful change of 
leadership, there would be a continuity of development programs without undermining past 
achievements. Accordingly, article 105 (2) states that “A person shall not be elected under 
this Constitution to hold office as President for more than two terms…”1 thus effectively 
limiting the tenure of the president to a maximum of 10 years. In 1996 and 2001, general 
elections were successfully held and won by incumbent President Yoweri Museveni. 
However, towards the 2006 elections, the Parliament amended the Constitution and lifted the 
term limitation to ensure that the incumbent could contest for as many times as he wished.  
 
Periodic elections are held every five years and are largely reported to be “free and 
fair” by regional and international observers. The NRM government is satisfied that the 
pledge of democracy has been fulfilled, because people have a chance to choose their leaders 
every five years. It seems, as the NRM wants to portray, that democracy means elections, and 
where there is elections automatically there is democracy.  
 
 
                                           
1 The Constitution of the Republic of Uganda 1995 placed a two-term limit of five years on the president. At the 
time of making the new constitution in 1995, the incumbent president had served for 9 years—which were not 
counted because he had captured power through a coup d’état. An election was organized in 1996 and 2001—
which he won all. He was supposed to step down in 2006 and allow a new president to take power, but the 
lifting of term limits by parliament in 2005 allowed him to stand for re-election in 2006 and 2011.  
3 
 
 
1.2 Statement of the problem 
In modern times, governments seek to distribute state power between its branches 
instead of having it rest in the hands of one individual, who would become a dictator. There 
are varying degrees of success achieved by various countries in trying to do this. The United 
States and other developed democracies in Europe and Asia have constructed quite robust 
systems for the separation of powers. On the other hand, much of the developing world, 
particularly in Africa, power is in the hands of powerful individuals—presidents.  
 
There is intense rivalry and contestation on the subject of term limits on the 
presidency in Uganda. Some people view the lack of term limits and prolonged stay in power 
by incumbent president as the main contributing factor for the unfair distribution of power 
between the government branches. On the other hand, others view open terms as an 
opportunity for continuity, stability and consolidation of past achievements. The restoration 
of presidential term limits movement is steadily gaining momentum among civil society, 
opposition parties and the general public. Even some of the legislators who supported the 
lifting of term limits in 2005 have publicly admitted that they were hoodwinked to vote for 
the amendment. The point that seems to be missed by the two parties is whether the mere 
presence of term limits guarantees the protection of the rights of Ugandans and independence 
of institutions and prevents the rise of a dictatorship. This research intends to examine 
whether and how the doctrine of Separation of Powers under a presidential system can be 
sufficiently upheld with or without term limits. The study will contribute to the current 
discourse on democracy, independence of institutions and efficiency, as well as good 
governance in Uganda.  
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1.3 Research questions 
This study seeks to: 
(i) Examine the origins, history and tradition of term limits in the United States and how 
it relates to the doctrine of Separation of Powers.  
(ii) Examine the cases of term limits in Venezuela, Cameroon and Egypt, and how it has 
affected the relationship between the three arms of government.  
(iii) Analyze the normative debate by proponents and opponents of term limits 
(iv) Explore options for democracy and make recommendations for good governance 
under no term limits 
The study will examine the question of presidential term limit from the bedrock 
principles of democracy: Separation of Powers, checks and balances, accountability, 
constitutionalism and the rule of law. Taking the U.S. as a model for term limits and 
Separation of Powers, this study will examine the trends in Uganda and other African 
countries which have term limits and those which do not.  
 
2.0 THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY 
 
 
 There are various views about democracy, yet they all have certain common 
characteristic: that no single person or group of persons has the warrant to rule others. They 
hold that “all persons are equal in many ways, and they deserve a say in how they should be 
governed.”2 Democratic theorists all share the view that members of the political community 
“carry elementary, rational capacities that are sufficient to judge the conduct of government.” 
For such judgments to have meaning, “democratic citizens are expected to be free in several 
important respects; including freedom of speech, assembly and conscience.” 
                                           
2 Jason Lewis (2011) 
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2.1 The doctrine of Separation of Powers 
The doctrine of Separation of Powers is largely credited to French enlightenment 
writer and philosopher Baron de Montesquieu, who proposed the idea based on the Roman 
Republic and the British constitutional systems. He argued that power in England and Roman 
Republic was less abused because their constitutions provided for checks and balances, as no 
single branch could claim absolute power. This was opposed to the French system where 
monarchs enjoyed too much power—and usually abused it. 
 
James Madison, also known as the “father of the Constitution of the United States” 
was influenced by Montesqueue’s ideas on constitutional guarantees that limited the powers 
of leaders. The proponents of the principle of Separation of Powers sought to avoid the rise 
dictatorship resulting from unchecked power of leaders. The three arms of government—the 
Executive, Legislature, and the Judiciary—are kept under checks and balances with and by 
each other to avoid abuse of power by any branch.  
 
Separation of Powers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Montesquiue’s Separation of Powers 
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Under the presidential system, the elected President is the head of the Executive 
branch and government. He appoints ministers, judges, and heads of other key institutions, 
depending on the constitutional provisions. He is also Commander-in-Chief of the armed 
forces, with the power to declare war. The Legislature makes laws, but needs the presidential 
assent before they come into force. The judiciary on the other hand interprets laws, and has 
the power to declare some laws unconstitutional. Ordinarily, this framework is supposed to 
ensure checks and balances among the branches of government. When this framework 
dysfunctions, the result is the rise of dictatorship.  
 
2.2 Checks and Balances under Separation of Powers 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thomas Jefferson argued that “the two enemies of the people are criminals and 
government, and there was need to tie the second with the chains of the Constitution so that it 
will not become the legalized version of the first.”3 He further argued that the constitutions 
are made not only to protect people from each other, but from the government they created.  
                                           
3 Jason Lewis; Power Divided is Power Checked: The arguments for States’ Rights 
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2.3 Term limits in the United States 
In the long history of the United States, term limits were not institutionalized until 
the 22nd Amendment of March 21, 1947 which came into force in February 1951 after being 
ratified by requisite number of states. This followed President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
successful bid for the fourth term in office, but unfortunately died before completing it. The 
22nd Amendment formerly imposed a two-term limit on the president in order to further check 
on the perpetuity of the presidency. The former American presidents had respected the 
tradition of ruling for not more than two terms, and had therefore seen no need to enshrine it 
in the constitution. The 22nd Amendment was in the spirit that the Separation of Powers 
through the three branches of government was not enough to safeguard against a dictatorship. 
Presidential term limits was therefore an additional firewall against the rise of dictatorship of 
the executive branch. It has since become a widely accepted principle for most democracies 
around the world. 
 
The idea of term limits, however, is not popular among many leaders in developing 
countries. History shows that even those who advocate for it at the beginning of their tenure 
later seek to amend the constitution in order to prolong their stay in power. In some of these 
countries, term limits were lifted, while in others, presidents are still struggling to amend 
their constitutions to do away with this limitation. In Uganda, term limits were lifted in 2005 
by Parliament, which opened the door for the incumbent president to stand for reelection for 
as many times as he wishes.  
 
There is no agreement on whether the existence of periodic elections alone without 
term limits is an adequate measure to control the likely excesses of the presidency. While 
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some argue that the absence of term limits undermines institutional growth and entrenches 
dictatorship,4 others claim that the longer a President stays in power, the better he/she will be 
able to execute the development programs without interruption since priorities remain the 
same. The former group further contends that absence of term limits on the president is itself 
a recipe for abuse of democracy and rule of law. They argue that when leaders stay in power 
for long, they undermine the growth of institutions in favour of personalities. To ensure that 
they win the next election, state resources and apparatus such as the army, police, and the 
economy itself are used to ensure the survival of the ruling party. 
  
The rise of democracy as the best form of governance has been a great phenomenon 
of the twentieth century. Only a few authoritarian regimes remain, mainly in the developing 
world. Although a vast majority of governments and leaders claim to be democratic, their 
democratic credentials are to be judged by their actions rather than what they call themselves. 
Fombad and Murray (2007) argue that the culture of constitutionalism is an integral element 
of any democratic society. For constitutionalism to thrive, there are certain conditions that 
must be met, and key among them is presidential term limits. Their study reveals that at the 
time of independence, African countries’ constitutions did not place term limits on their 
leaders, which helped them entrench themselves in power, often creating a myth of 
indispensability around themselves.5 Between 1960 and 2007, out of over 180 presidents who 
                                           
4 Pablo Querubin (2011); Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and political dynasties 
in the Philippines 
5 See, e.g, Jean-Bedel Bokassa of the Central African Republic (who later proclaimed himself 
‘emperor’), Francisco Macias Nguema of Equatorial Guinea, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Hastings 
Banda of Malawi, Gnassingbé Eyadéma of Togo, Idi Amin of Uganda and Mobotu Sese Seko of 
Zaire. As BO Nwabueze in Presidentialism in Commonwealth Africa (1974) 1 points out, 
presidentialism in Africa has tended towards dictatorship and tyranny, not so much because of its 
great power as because of insufficient constitutional, political and social restraint upon that power. 
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had held power in Africa, less than 20 percent of them had done so through peaceful means. 
Accordingly, the absence of term limits has the dangerous tendency of elevating the president 
into a cult and an institution, and turning the office into an inheritance, thus preventing 
people from choosing their leaders.6 
 
The study contends that the post-1990 constitutional rights revolution introduced 
term limits in an attempt to end ‘perpetual incumbency.’ However, like the transition to 
constitutional democracy itself, respect for constitutions, adherence to the rule of law and the 
proper functioning of state institutions remain a major problem. It is therefore no surprise that 
provisions on presidential term limits have come under assault in many African countries as 
many leaders still maneuver to prolong their stay in power.  
 
It is contended that, because of their increasing importance, presidential term limits 
must now be considered as an essential element under a presidential system because it 
minimizes the incumbent’s ability to override other institutions. This, it is suggested, can be 
done by specially entrenching them in the constitution in a manner that will make their 
amendment very difficult and adding provisions containing special incentives, such as 
comfortable retirement packages, certain diplomatic privileges, and limited immunity from 
criminal prosecution to encourage Africa’s Big Men to relinquish power voluntarily. 
 
What appears to be emerging is that many African political leaders do not like the 
term limits. However, this phenomenon is not surprising for, even in developed countries like 
the United States, which has had a much longer experience of term limits, studies have shown 
                                           
6Nearly three quarters of the African leaders who left power in the 1960s and 1970s did so via 
coup, violent overthrow or assassination. See DN Posner & DJ Young ‘The institutionalization of 
political power in Africa’ (2007) 18 Journal of Democracy 128-129. 
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that a majority of politicians as well as interest groups who depend on politicians for 
employment, patronage and other benefits are opposed to term limits because they have a 
misperception of democracy and hope to benefit from the incumbent’s prolonged stay in 
power. 
 
The African practice with respect to term limits since 1990 suggests that it is possible 
to place the different countries into at least four groups: 1) those countries where the 
presidents have willingly adhered to the term limits, such as South Africa, Botswana and 
Mozambique; 2) those countries where the presidents have adhered to the term limits only 
under pressure from the public and after abortive attempts to override the terms limits, such 
as Nigeria, Zambia and Malawi; 3) those countries where the presidents succeeded in 
overriding the term limits, such as Uganda and Cameroon; and 4) those countries where the 
incumbents have not yet exhausted their two terms, such as Rwanda, Burundi and DRC. 
 
Fombad and Murray (2007) argue that absence of term limits is dangerous to a 
country because leaders lose touch with the grassroots and rule in a manner that is 
unresponsive to the needs and wishes of the people, thus promoting a lack of accountability 
in governance, necessitating in many instances their forceful removal from power through 
coups d’état. Indeed, in campaigning for lifting of term limits in Uganda, president Museveni 
portrayed himself as an exceptional leader who had brought peace, stability and development 
to his country and needed more time to complete the programme. It is also argued that term 
limits reduce the barriers to entry to politics, facilitate the process of developing a culture of 
political competition and enhance the prospects for political development and the 
consolidation of democracy. On the other hand, term limits provide a framework that not only 
ensures that political power is not retained for too long, but also that no cult of personality 
develops around the leader. 
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The study suggests that two terms are long enough for leaders to manifest their 
exceptional leadership qualities and to complete their programmes as well as to give others 
the opportunity to also display their own leadership qualities. 
 
Term limits are usually misunderstood under the parliamentary democracy. Unlike in 
the presidential system where the president is elected directly by the people, the Prime 
Minister (head of government) is chosen from the party which wins majority of seats in the 
House. Every party has its own mechanism of choosing its leader who is most likely to lead it 
to victory in elections. It is therefore not possible for an individual to perpetually manipulate 
the party members to remain at the helm, as this could cost the party during elections. This 
contrasts with the presidential system where the president derives legitimacy directly from 
the people (majority of which in developing countries are illiterate) who can easily be 
manipulated. Accordingly, it is erroneous to argue that countries like the UK, Israel, Australia 
and Canada are strong democracies but with no term limits; without explaining how their 
systems differ from the presidential system.  
 
2.4 The fallacy of elections 
 
The spread of democratic ideals after World War II has rendered all forms of 
authoritarianism unpalatable, both the rulers and the ruled. Even the most authoritarian 
regimes like North Korea want to associate themselves with the term democracy. However, I 
contend that the term “democracy” is one of the most misunderstood. In many countries, 
especially the developing world, “democracy” has come to be synonymous with “elections.” 
It is now trendy for leaders to legitimize their dictatorship through elections. Schedler (2002) 
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argues that by simply identifying democracy with elections, we are in danger of forgetting 
that the modern history of representative elections is a tale of authoritarian manipulations as 
much as it is a saga of democratic triumphs.”7 He argues that elections have been an 
instrument of authoritarian control as well as a means of democratic governance.  
 
According to Schedler (2002) elections have given birth to new forms of 
authoritarianism that do not fit into classic categories of one-party, military, or personal 
dictatorship. Accordingly, there is an increasing number of countries that hold elections and 
tolerate some level of pluralism and multi-party competition, yet they do not respect the 
minimal democratic principles. Hence, it makes no sense to classify them as democracies, 
however qualified they may seem.  
 
Fareed (1997) argues that mere elections can give rise to “illiberal democracy.” Such 
are regimes which win elections and are declared to be “free and fair” by election observers, 
yet the elected officials are racist, fascist, separatist, and vehemently opposed to peace and 
development. Indeed, the world is continuously witnessing democratically elected regimes 
which are routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and denying their citizens 
basic rights and freedoms. Fareed argues that western democracy meant “liberal” 
democracy—a political system marked by not only free and fair elections, but by also the rule 
of law, a separation of powers, and the protection of basic liberties of speech, assembly, 
religion and property.” 8  According to Fareed, what is being practiced in many new 
democracies is theoretically and practically distinct from the western model of democracy.  
 
                                           
7 Schedler: “Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation”,   
8  Fareed Zakaria is the Managing Editor of Foreign Affairs and a contributing writer of the 
Newsweek. 
13 
 
The new form of authoritarian regimes camouflage as democracies. They neither 
practice real democracy nor resort to naked repression. Regular elections are used for the 
purpose of obtaining a false image of democratic legitimacy, hoping to satisfy their populace 
as well as cooling external pressure especially from the donor community. Elections are 
placed under tight authoritarian controls; in the process they cement their continued hold on 
power. Such is the behavior of many popular democracies in developing countries.  
 
Schedler (2002) contends that most regimes today occupy a Foggy Zone between 
liberal democracy and electoral authoritarianism. While liberal democracies go beyond the 
electoral minimum, electoral authoritarians do not. They manage to “get elections right” but 
fail to uphold and sustain other vital dimensions of democratic constitutionalism, such as the 
rule of law, political accountability, bureaucratic integrity, and public deliberation.  
 
2.5 What is a democratic election? 
 
Robert Dahl puts forward seven conditions which must be fulfilled for any election 
to be called as democratic: 1) Empowerment—political elections are about citizens wielding 
power. Elections exist to accomplish the binding selection of the polity’s most powerful 
collective decision makers. 2) Free supply—the range of available alternatives cannot be 
something engineered by a manipulative government, but must be determined by active 
citizens themselves within a framework of fair and universal rules. 3) Free demand—
democratic elections presuppose the free formation of voter preferences. Citizens who vote 
on the basis of induced preferences are no less constrained than those who must choose from 
a manipulated set of alternatives. 4) Inclusion—democracy demands universal suffrage. 
Restrictions of the franchise once commonly applied on the basis of property, education, 
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gender, or ethnicity are not legitimate anymore. 5) Insulation—once citizens have freely 
formed their preferences, they must be able to express them just as freely. The use of the 
secret ballot is designed to shield them from undue outside pressures, whether in the form of 
actual or threatened coercion, bribery, or even just the disapproval of neighbors. 6) 
Integrity—once citizens have given free expression to their will at the polls, competent and 
neutral election management must count their votes honestly and weigh them equally. 7) 
Irreversibility—like elections that begin without choice, elections that end without 
consequences are not democratic. The winners must be able to assume office, exercise power, 
and conclude their terms in accordance with constitutional rules.  
Of course, there is no single country whose elections can perfectly meet Dahl’s 
conditions. They just work as a yardstick to help us judge how far or how near an election is 
from being democratic. By using this yardstick, we can plot different countries’ elections to 
determine how democratic (and therefore how legitimate) their regimes are. The longer 
leaders stay in power and seek to legitimize themselves, the more their elections slide down 
on Dahl’s yardstick.  
3.0 HYPOTHESIS 
This study is based on the hypothesis that absence of term limits tilts the balance of 
power among the three branches of government in favour of the executive president, leading 
to a dictatorship. Because of the uniqueness of the roles and privileges of the executive 
branch, a powerful president who perpetually stays in power can erode the independence and 
functioning of the Legislature and Judiciary, thus leading to a dictatorship. To avoid this, 
there is need for term limits as an additional firewall to protect the country from the excesses 
of the executive president.  
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The longer one stays in office, the more he needs to consolidate his position through 
exercising control over other branches of government. Because people naturally resent their 
leaders, a perpetual president uses dictatorial means like force, repressive laws and other 
diversionary tactics to keep himself in power. With time, the leader becomes insensitive to the 
real needs of the people and puts his interest ahead of those of the people. In the next section, 
I test the hypothesis by critically examining the experiences of three nascent democracies: 
Venezuela, Cameroon and Egypt. Examples from other developing countries which are 
struggling with democratization process will also be used. 
4.0 CASE STUDIES 
  This chapter is the presentation of the findings of the study. It comprises of the 
descriptive and inductive information gathered on the topic under study. The first part is the 
descriptive presentation of the relationship between the executive branch and other organs of 
government as regards constitutional amendment on term limits in Venezuela, Cameroon and 
Egypt. The second part analyses the pro-term limits and anti-term limits arguments in relation 
to building a stable and sustainable democracy.  
4.1 Term limits in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
The case of Venezuela’s constitutional amendment to lift term limits is atypical 
example of the overriding power of the executive over the legislature and the judiciary. 
Promulgated in 1999 through a referendum, the Venezuelan constitution previously provided 
for a 3 term limit for deputies and 2 term limit for other offices including the president. 
President Hugo Chavez first proposed the amendment to the constitution in 2007, but was not 
successful after nationwide protests by university students played a key role in the result of 
the referendum. But the president would not give up his ambition. He simply had to go back 
to the drawing board. He argued that the constitutional amendment was necessary for the 
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implementation of his socialist program. Chavez had an experience of his earlier unsuccessful 
coup attempt against the government of Carlos Andres Perez in 1992.  
Chavez reintroduced his proposal for constitutional amendment by the end of 2008, 
known as Amendment No. 1 of the Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. It 
was later put to a referendum on February 15, 2009, and endorsed by a simple majority of 54 
percent of registered voters. The provisions of the constitution affected by the Amendment 
No. 1 of the Constitution are: 
Previous Current 
Article 160: The governor shall be elected for a four-
year term by the majority of the votes cast. The governor 
may be re-elected immediately and only once for one 
more term. 
Article 160: The governor shall be elected for a 
four-year term by the majority of the votes cast. 
The governor may be re-elected. 
Article 162: The regional legislators shall be elected for 
a maximum of two terms in a row. 
Article 162: The regional legislators may be re-
elected. 
Article 174: The mayor shall be elected for a four-year 
term by the majority of the votes cast and may be re-
elected immediately and only once for one more term. 
Article 174: The mayor shall be elected for a four-
year term by the majority of the votes cast and 
may be re-elected. 
Article 192: The deputies for the National Assembly are 
elected for a five-year term with the possibility of re-
election for a maximum of two terms in a row. 
Article 192: The deputies for the National 
Assembly are elected for a five-year term with the 
possibility of re-election. 
Article 230: The presidential term of office lasts six 
years. The President of the Republic may be re-elected 
immediately and only once for one more term. 
Article 230: The presidential term of office lasts 
six years. The President of the Republic may be 
re-elected. 
Table 1: Proposed constitutional changes in Amendment No. 1 of the Constitution of the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 2009. 
Source: Wikipedia; retrieved on October 29, 2012 
from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venezuelan_constitutional_referendum,_2009#Provisions_of_the_amendment  
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4.2 Controversies surrounding the referendum 
 
The referendum question was skewed in favor of a Yes vote. The National Electoral 
Council, a body overseeing the electoral process, is blamed for being a rubber-stamp for 
Chavez. The question put to the electorate read: 
 
Do you approve the amendment of articles 160, 162, 174, 192 and 230 of the 
Constitution of the Republic, as processed by the National Assembly, which increases 
the political rights of the people, with the purpose of allowing any citizen incumbent in 
an elected office, to be nominated as candidate for the same office, for the period of 
time established constitutionally, his or her possible re-election depending exclusively 
on popular vote? 
 
It is important to point out that the question portrayed the proposed constitutional 
amendment as a necessary action to “increase the political rights of the people” and a “No 
vote” would mean restricting the people’s rights. The result of the referendum was not a 
convincing enough as a reflection of the will of majority of Venezuelans. In most 
democracies, such major constitutional amendments require a convincing at least a two-thirds 
majority of either the legislature or electorate. A simple majority is not enough. The result of 
the referendum was as below: 
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Results of the Venezuela constitutional referendum, 2009. 
Venezuelan constitutional referendum, 2009 
Choice Votes Percentage 
Yes 6,310,482 54.85% 
No 5,193,839 45.15% 
Valid votes 11,504,321 98.24% 
Invalid or blank votes 206,419 1.76% 
Total votes 11,710,740 100.00% 
Voter turnout 70.33% 
Electorate 16,652,179 
Table 2: Results of Venezuela Constitutional referendum of 2009. 
Source: Wikipedia -
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venezuelan_constitutional_referendum,_2009  
Given that the amendment was sponsored by the incumbent president and political 
party, coupled with the direct and indirect influence of the state machinery in the electoral 
process, the 54 percent Yes vote has been criticized as not reflecting the will of the 
Venezuelans. According to opposition figure Leopoldo Lopez, the No camp was not 
competing against “a political party, but against an entire state and all of the power it can 
wield.” The pro-amendment camp used government resources ranging from full support for 
the “Yes” campaign on state owned radio and television, to display of “Yes” campaign 
advertisements on official ministry websites. It can therefore be argued that were the question 
of amendment to be put to the vote through a free and fair referendum, majority of 
Venezuelans would have rejected it.  
 
Another criticism of the amendment was the state brutality against the January 16, 
2009 student protests. Aware of the role the student protests played in the 2007 failure, the 
Chavez government violently cracked down on protesters in Caracas.  Chavez ordered the 
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authorities to ensure such protests were ended with maximum use of force. Tear gas was fired 
at the compound of the papal nuncio, who had granted asylum to an anti-Chávez student 
leader. These events, therefore, demonstrated the nature of environment in which the 
government was determined to see the Amendment passed.  
 
Having secured the mandate to stand for election in 2012, President Hugo Chavez 
was able to win another 6-year term that extends his rule to 2019. He polled a simple majority 
of 55.2 percent, against his closest challenger who polled 44.1 percent. The election was 
largely peaceful and President Chavez congratulated by most South American governments 
who look at him as a champion of the Latin American revolution. Surprisingly, the White 
House also issued a congratulatory message to the Venezuelan people upon a high voter 
turnout and peaceful election.  
4.3 The Republic of Cameroon 
For many reasons, Cameroon is little talked about—at least in the international media. 
At 79, President Paul Biya is one of Africa’s oldest and longest serving president, having 
served for 29 years. He came to power in November 1982 after the surprise resignation of 
President Ahmadou Ahidjo. He consolidated himself in power and has since won elections in 
1992, 1997, 2004 and 2011. Independent observers have always labeled the elections on all 
these occasions as marred by widespread irregularities.  
 
Having ruled under a single-party system, President Biya was under pressure from 
the Anglophone region to return to a federal system and introduce multiparty system. He 
responded by introducing ‘Law number 96/06’ which gave way for the enactment of new 
Constitution in 1996. Notably, article 14 established a Senate as the upper house of legislature, 
and Article 6, extended the president’s term limit to 7 years. It also provided that the president 
of the Senate or vice-president should be the president's successor in case of eventualities.  
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4.4 The 2008 Amendment  
On April 10, 2008, the National Assembly overwhelmingly passed a bill to change 
the Constitution by emending the Law 96/06. Among many other changes, the amendment 
provided the president with immunity from prosecution for acts as president and allowed him 
to stand for unlimited re-elections. This vote took place a month after anti-government 
protests against the price rises and proposed constitutional changes. These were violently 
crashed resulting in dozens of deaths and hundreds of arrests. The opposition Social 
Democratic Front (SDF) protested by walking out of the Assembly.  
 
The opposition was denied access to the media by the state machinery. Opposition-
leaning artists and journalists were banned from the air. One artist, Lapiro De Mbanga, who 
had composed a song titled "Constitution constipée" ("Constipated Constitution") was 
arrested, and painter Joe La Conscience, who had attempted to walk to Yaoundé from Loum 
to give a petition of 100 signatures to the President protesting the constitutional changes. He 
was later sentenced to six months in prison. Although the proposed changes were published 
in the Cameroon Tribune—the official newspaper—there was no mention of the crucial 
changes to Article 53 paragraphs 3 and 5 which gave immunity to the president from 
prosecution after office. This lack of transparency was undemocratic. 
 
Even before the constitutional amendment had been made, there were indications that 
Paul Biya was interested in elongating his stay in power. He had earlier consented to a two-
term limit in article 6(2) of the amended Cameroonian Constitution of 1996, only after 
extending the normal presidential tenure from five years to seven years and ensuring that the 
powers of the executive were considerably increased whilst those of the legislature and 
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judiciary were reduced. President Biya used all the available state machinery including the 
army and police to intimidate, frustrate and weaken the opposition to the constitutional 
changes. His grip on power is sustained by personalization of state apparatus. It can therefore 
be argued that the Constitutional changes were introduced to favour one individual—the 
president.  
 
Fombad and Murray (2010) observed that the Cameroonian case is so unique because 
by the time the constitution was amended, Paul Biya had been in power for 26 years, and still 
had four more years to complete his term. It was a time when international attention was 
focused on Zimbabwe, where Robert Mugabe had clearly lost the presidential elections but 
refused to concede defeat and leave gracefully. In 2011, president Biya won the election by 
77.9 percent, with his closest challenger, John Fru Ndi Ni polling only 10.7 percent. Biya’s 
current term runs till 2018, when he will be 87, and will be eligible for re-election. 
 
4.5 Term limits in the Arab Republic of Egypt 
The February 2011 Egyptian uprising was largely due to the need for constitutional 
changes that expanded people’s freedoms to choose their leaders. The then President Hosni 
Mubarak had assumed power in October 1981 following the assassination of President Anwar 
El Sadat. Before reform in 2005, the Egyptian Constitution restricted Egyptians from 
competing against the President because the People’s Assembly played a key role in electing 
the President. Thus, Mubarak was elected in 1981, 1987, 1993 and 1999 through a 
referendum. On all these occasions, Mubarak maneuvered his way to secure his position 
through a referendum without opposition. 
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There was increased domestic and international pressure for reform. Mubarak then 
asked Parliament on 26 February 2005 to amend the Constitution and allow competitive 
presidential elections which took place in September 2005. He however remained with tight 
control over the electoral process and the security organs. The media, too, openly supported 
President Mubarak. Civil society organizations which monitored the election observed mass 
electoral fraud by Mubarak’s team. The opposition leader who challenged the result in the 
courts of law was arrested on charges of forgery, and later sentenced to five years with hard 
labour. In expressing their dissatisfaction with the political persecution of the opposition 
leaders, the White House released a statement calling for “increased openness and political 
dialogue within Egypt.”  
  
Osman (2005), a leading Egyptian political analyst, argues that Mubarak’s style of 
rule was “highly influenced by the experience of witnessing his predecessor assassinated 
right in front of him.” He was also a long term military man, who knew the science and art of 
controlling the state. Osman further contends that Mubarak sought advice “not from the 
official bureaucratic structures and educated advisors, but from his security chiefs especially 
the interior ministers, army commanders, and the heads of the ultra-influential intelligence 
services.” Because of his hardliner position against Islamic fundamentalism, together with his 
friendliness towards Israel, he became a target of repeated assassination attempts. 
Accordingly, he always put in place stricter controls over the state and involved the military 
and para-military institutions in Egyptian politics. Mubarak was believed to have been 
grooming his son, Gamal Mubarak, whose public profile had been increasing, as his 
successor. Therefore, there was no regard to the Egyptian constitution on matters of 
presidential succession. 
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4.6 The new Egyptian Constitution 
The 2011 uprising that ousted President Mubarak led to the promulgation of a new, 
more liberal constitution. Under the new Constitution, the President is eligible to stand for re-
election only once for a four-year term. People’s freedoms have been expanded, and the role 
of the military has been greatly diminished. President Muhammad Mursi, the first civilian 
president of Egypt, has so far demonstrated a commitment to transform Egypt from a 
military-run government to a civilian one. The National Assembly and Judiciary have to a 
greater extent exercised their independence from the influence of the president. For example, 
in October 2012, President Mursi was embarrassed when his attempt to sack the Chief 
Prosecutor was unsuccessful, as the court ruled that the President had no power to sack him. 
The courts of law proved to be a crucial front in Egypt's transition to democracy, and on 
several occasions have determined the path of political disagreements between the players in 
three arms of government. This was never the case under Mubarak.   
 
At this time, it is still too early to predict with certainty the future of Egyptian 
democracy, specifically the relationship between the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. 
Perhaps, the experience from the 2011 uprising will teach the current and future Egyptian 
leaders that the era for dictatorship is over, and people have the right to choose how they 
should be governed.  
 
In summary, constitutions are designed to last in order to ensure political stability.  
However, constitutions are not infallible documents that should endure regardless of the 
changes in the peoples’ circumstances and values. Fombad argues that “when the 
management of the Constitutional changes falters, the country is likely to face the twin 
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dangers of extra-legal or revolutionary methods of change” like in Egypt on one hand; and 
“arbitrary, hasty and opportunistic changes” like in Venezuela and Cameroon on the other. 
 
5.0 DISCUSSION 
This chapter is a presentation of an analysis of the findings in relation to the research 
questions.  
5.1 Arguments for term limits 
Term limits are a necessary check on executive power to prevent it from becoming a 
dictatorship. It may be argued that the legislature and judiciary are also likely to become 
dictatorships if they become too independent. However, unlike the legislature and judiciary 
which are composed of diverse views, with members of various political parties and 
inclinations represented, the executive of a country usually is a single entity, speaking with 
one voice. Cabinet ministers are usually appointed by the president, and those who express 
divergent views are forced to resign from the executive. Executive power rests solely in the 
hands of the president, with full power over the decisions of the executive branch of 
government. Cabinets, which form part of the executive in practice, are usually directly 
answerable to the president. It is thus necessary to have a check on the highly individual 
power of the president and term limits are the best such check.  
 
By observing the trends in Cameroon, Venezuela, Egypt and Uganda, this study 
found that it becomes necessary that when the president enacts his policies over a set time 
period, there must come a time when they are ushered out of office. This is essential because 
too much power in the hands of one individual or group can in the long run upset the balance 
of power in a country, usually in favour of the executive. When a set of policies, for example, 
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Chavez’s socialist revolution, are perceived to have failed, a new leadership can usher in 
alternative policies which may ultimately help the country move forward.  
 
In Uganda, the president came to power in 1986 with the famous Ten Point Program 
which included achieving minimum economic recovery, national unity and building 
infrastructure. However, the president has been criticized for having abandoned this program 
and allowed his government to divert into populist programs that consolidate him and his 
party in power at the expense of national development. It is at such a stage that term limits 
would have brought in by new leaders could have moved the country forward. 
 
The study further reveals that absence of term limits brings the president closer to the 
temptations of being corrupted by power and become insensitive to the interests of the people. 
This is true in Uganda, Cameroon and Egypt under Mubarak where dissenting voices are 
suppressed using force and other unjust laws. The Ugandan lawmakers have recently passed 
some laws that undermine the enjoyment of people’s rights. There are also some proposals 
for draconian legislations that would limit citizens’ participation in governance and holding 
their leaders accountable. For example, he Public Order Management Bill (POMB, 2009) in 
Uganda prohibits demonstrations and requires that written permission from the Chief of 
Police be obtained before any political gathering can be held. This was worsened by the fear 
that citizens may topple the government like in North Africa and Middle East. The opposition 
has thus faced heavy crackdown by security forces under the pretext of keeping public order.  
 
The study reveals that when a leader is firmly entrenched, he will usually seek to 
enrich himself at the expense of the public. The only way to insure his survival is by placing 
family members and close friends in strategic positions in government. The military, police, 
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public service and key parastatals are put in the hands of people who may not necessarily be 
competent to run them, but pay allegiance to the president. This, in the long term, becomes 
counter-productive. In Uganda, a clear family tree of the president is firmly in control of key 
agencies including the cabinet, the army, police, business sector and social affairs. Case in 
point is the president’s wife who is a cabinet minister, his younger brother an army general, 
his son a commander of the Special Forces, and close relatives heading key ministries like 
Foreign Affairs and Agriculture. All these are signs that prolonged stay in power results in 
personalization of state power and resources by the all-powerful leader.  
 
This study also finds that where there are no term limits, the powerful president is 
more likely to turn the executive into a personal club, rather than an office of first servant of 
the people, as it should be. In Uganda, for example, state funds are used to generate electoral 
support from key groups and to maintain the loyalty of essential supporters. Even donor 
money is used for populist programs that make the leaders popular for the upcoming elections. 
In Venezuela, President Chavez was able to personalize power for 14 years. When he was 
unable to execute the duties of his office due to ill-health, the constitution was disregarded on 
who would take on the presidential duties in Chavez’s absence. In this case, term limits 
would have served to limit the ability of individuals like Chavez to enact self-aggrandizing 
policies and to retain power for as long as they live.  
 
This study shows that incumbency generally gives a huge election advantage. History 
shows that incumbents in the United States are almost always re-elected. Politicians are re-
elected because they are better recognized both by the electorate and powerful lobby groups 
which give them funding. People tend to vote for familiar candidates, and lobby groups 
support those who have won in the past and are likely to continue to meet their interests. This 
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notion is even more serious in young democracies in which revolutionary leaders from the 
independence movements and political parties are still politically active. Such leaders still 
command considerable support as they ride on people’s anti-colonial sentiments. This partly 
explains why Robert Mugabe has been able to cling to power by winning periodic 
presidential elections in spite of economic and other mismanagement challenges 
Zimbabweans are facing.  
 
The study identifies the existence of an uphill battle new politicians face to unseat 
incumbents. This makes term limits necessary for the health of democratic systems. Countries 
need new policies which come from a new set of leaders. Politicians who use pseudo-
elections to retain power hurt their countries. It is necessary that power changes hands over 
time in order to allow for dynamic new solutions to be applied in a changing world. Term 
limits can cater for this necessity. 
 
Furthermore, it can be argued that leaders who are looking to the next election 
usually focus on winning as many voters as possible to themselves. Leaders need to make 
some decisions which may be unpopular with the voters but necessary for long term progress 
of the country. This makes it hard for perpetual leaders to make such decisions for fear of 
losing elections. When term limits are in place and respected, leaders tend to make the most 
of their limited time in office, thus prioritizing difficult but crucial decisions and reforms. In 
Uganda’s last two elections, local and foreign business companies have offered support to the 
incumbent party in return for lucrative deals after elections. Under these circumstances, tough 
decisions that are in the national interest have been sacrificed. While there will always be 
some of this behaviour, such a tendency is minimized by term limits. 
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Furthermore, having term limits helps build institutions especially political parties, 
through which retiring leaders can influence the next leadership such the choice of their 
successor, ensuring that they have a legacy. Accordingly, term limits encourage the 
development of strong institutions upon which political decisions are made, rather than those 
based on personalities. Indeed, from the study of Cameroon and Uganda, political parties are 
so weak that they can disappear from the picture in case the party leader loses power. 
5.2 Arguments against term limits 
Democracy—the government of, by and for the people—means that the citizenry, 
regardless of their social, economic and political status, have the power to make choices on 
who and how they should be ruled. It is therefore grossly undemocratic, arguably, to prevent 
people from choosing a leader they like because he has completed a permissible number of 
terms in office. If a leader has done well during his term of office, and still has the capacity to 
lead, and the people like him, then it should be their choice to re-elect him. Like the case of 
Venezuela, where Hugo Chavez is very popular with his socialist revolution, it would be 
undemocratic to deny Venezuelans the right to re-elect a man who represents the ideals they 
feel are in line with the future they desire. Preventing a popular leader from standing for re-
election denies the electorate the right to choose who and how they need to be governed.  
 
Whereas the above argument holds some water, it is important to consider the 
circumstances under which re-election of the “popular” leader is done. Young democracies 
still battle with low literacy levels, inadequate civic education, voter intimidation and bribery, 
and partisan electoral bodies. Therefore, it is hard to determine whether the claimed 
popularity of the leader genuinely stems from the people’s support, or such extraneous factors 
like ignorance, bribery and intimidation. 
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As Meredith (2003) points out, where leaders have wrested power from the other 
branches and become dictators, as in Cameroon, the cause of the problem is not a lack of 
term limits, but rather a lack of adequate separation of powers in government. Term limits 
cannot stop the rise of dictatorship, as a would-be dictator can easily remove term limits by 
use of his powers. The solution to dictatorship, therefore, is the establishment of robust 
democratic institutions and a genuine separation of powers.  
 
Meredith further argues that “a strong leader may be necessary to counter the 
potential tyranny of a dominant legislature as much as the reverse. Removing term limits may 
therefore ensure balance among the power centres of government and thus avoid a 
dictatorship.” However, in most developing countries, there are rare cases where the 
legislature has become so powerful to threaten the executive. In Uganda, for example, 
members of the legislature who have become outspoken against the government have been 
silenced either through giving them ministerial appointments, business contracts, or 
disciplinary actions taken against them. In the end, the balance of power still tilts in favour of 
the executive. 
 
In countries which are still battling fundamental problems like internal divisions, 
poverty, and civil war, it can be argued that continuity and experience are very important 
elements in providing steady and transformational leadership. Experienced leaders can easily 
navigate the difficult path of politics, and such experience is critical in the executive. In 
Rwanda, for example, after the 1994 genocide that killed almost 1 million people and left the 
country deeply divided on ethnic lines, it has been necessary to have a strong president for 
more than the usual two-terms in order to stabilize the country and set it on the path of 
30 
 
recovery. Uganda was equally in the same situation after 1986. However, it would be 
important that in such unique circumstances, term limits are opened up for a specified time 
rather than forever.  
 
Historical evidence suggests that having no term limits allows visionary leaders to 
focus on long-term national development programs that might take more than the time 
allotted to them under term limits. When new leaders come to office, always take some time 
getting used to their new responsibilities, thus not putting to efficient use the valuable time 
they have in effective delivery. In some situations, new leaders want to break ties with the old 
systems, thus taking much time to deliver. Arguably, South Korea was able to build a solid 
economic foundation during the leadership of dictator Park Chung-hee. Although democracy 
fell casualty to his reign, he laid the foundation of modern Korea through his strong, 
visionary leadership. Developing countries at times have to make a choice between 
democracy and human rights on one hand, and economic and orderly development on the 
other. Finding a leader who can strike the balance between the two is a challenge, but if poor 
countries have to make a choice now, they may choose the latter.   
 
6.0  SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This section summarizes the ideas expressed in the previous chapters. A conclusion is 
also drawn in relation to term limits relate with separation of powers.  
6.1  Summary and conclusion 
From the facts analyzed, the study finds that presidential term limits are an important firewall 
against entrenchment of dictatorship of the executive president. As former British legislator 
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William Pit put it, “unlimited power is apt to corrupt the minds of those who possess it.” An 
analysis of Venezuela, Cameroon, Egypt and Uganda in regards to presidential term limits 
leads to a common conclusion: unlimited power in the hands of leaders undermines 
institutions and the democratization process. The Legislature and Judiciary are the first 
casualties of unlimited terms, as they fail to exercise their constitutional powers due to 
pressure from the executive. If they resist pressure, they are persecuted; if they give in, their 
independence is further eroded. In the end, it is the citizens who suffer the repressive and 
unresponsive regime—corruption, press censorship, poor service delivery and uncertainty. 
6.2  Recommendations 
From the study, constitutional firewalls are recommended to minimize on the excesses of the 
president. As James Madison believed, the chains of the constitution are necessary to protect 
the citizens from the two twin enemies—the state and the criminals. Once the constitution 
becomes easily manipulated to favour the executive, the state becomes a legalized version of 
criminals. Accordingly, it is recommended that the amendment of the constitution should be 
very difficult that it is done only when necessary. The United States constitution has endured 
for generations without major alterations. This is not because leaders have not deemed it 
necessary to change, but the process is so complex that they cannot tamper with it. A 
constitutional change through a referendum should require at least three-quarters of the 
population voting in the affirmative in order for the proposed changes to be accepted.  
 
In parliament, since the ruling party legislators are usually manipulated to vote in certain 
ways yet they enjoy majority seats, a ¾ requirement can also go far in preventing 
constitutional changes that are deemed to be of long term effect, such as lifting of term limits 
and giving immunity from prosecution to former presidents.  
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It is also recommended that certain amendments should only be carried out after a lengthy 
consultative process with the citizens. In this case, a vote in parliament or referendum 
hurriedly organized should be unable to effect constitutional amendments. These measures 
can minimize on the excesses of the executive president. 
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